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This paper tests the Pairs Trading strategy as proposed by Gatev, Goetzmann and 
Rouwenhorts (2006). It investigates if the profitability of pairs opening after an 
above average volume day in one of the assets are distinct in returns characteristics 
and if the introduction of a limit on the days the pair is open can improve the 
strategy returns. Results suggest that indeed pairs opening after a single sided 
shock are less profitable and that a limitation on the numbers of days a pair is open 
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The general principle of the efficient markets hypothesis in the strong form
1
 (Fama 
1970) states that in an informational efficient market “security prices at any time 
fully reflect all available information” (Fama 1970, 383). This principle implies that 
returns should be the product of risk taking and excess risk adjusted returns should 
only be attained by luck so getting them in a systematic way is a violation of this 
principle.  
This academic hypothesis is in an everyday challenge in the marketplace. Many 
participants believe in their ability to outperform the market and achieve better risk 
adjusted returns. The existence of portfolio managers that report outstanding cost 
adjusted returns for extended periods of time raises doubts into the extent markets 
are efficient.  
To address these questions several empirical market tests have been conducted 
through the years that attempt to investigate to which extent are financial markets 
in fact efficient (testing the three forms of efficiency). And it takes just one 
exception to prove that a market is inefficient (as opposed to proving that is 
efficient, which requires that all possible strategies are proven efficient) but that 
alone is not an easy task. It’s not simple to measure risk and cost adjusted returns.   
Excess returns can remain unexplained because of unidentified risks factors like 
extreme events (event risk) that are yet to happen. Liquidity, political and 
                                                           
1
 Fama 1970 defines three forms of efficiency: the weak form, that states that prices reflect all 
publicly available information, the semi-strong form, that states that prices reflect all publicly 
available information and instantly adjust to reflect new publicly available information and the 
strong form that states that prices reflect relevant monopolistic information. 
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regulatory risk can be difficult to quantify. For example, the risk that regulators 
prohibit short selling
2
 has to be accounted for in strategies that short securities. 
Operational risk is always present and is naturally higher when strategies have to be 
implemented via electronic execution with computer programming. The cost to 
raise capital or the cost of information gathering can also help to explain excess 
returns in strategies that need these structures. Transactions costs are sometimes 
difficult to quantify and can dramatically reduce the profitability of these strategies. 
Therefore when testing for market efficiency, is imperative that a simple strategy is 
used to explore a possible anomaly, one that can be simply evaluated in terms of 
risks and costs involved and one that could be easily implemented by market 
participants. 
One simple test (of the weak form of efficiency) can be conducted by evaluating the 
profitability of a pairs trading strategy that is build only with historical price and 
volume data. 
                                                           
2
 There are several situations when regulators prohibited short selling. For example, the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission prohibited short selling from 19 September 2008 to 2 October 
of 2008 because of the increased volatility of price assets. 
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II. Pairs Trading Review 
2.1. The Strategy 
The pairs trading strategy has a simple rationale: If one cannot price a red apple, 
one can at least say that two perfectly good red apples (equal in all characteristics) 
in the same place in time and space are worth the same (assuming rationality). And 
we can go further, we can assume that there is some stable relationship between 
the price of a red apple and a green one in the stated conditions.  
Pairs trading is an investment strategy that is based on this relative value rationale. 
First introduced academically by Gatev, Goetzmann and Rouwenhorts (2006) 
(hereafter “GGR”) pairs trading looks for violations of the law of one price and 
explores the principle that if two financial assets (most commonly stocks) have the 
same value and risk drivers, then their relative price should be a stable relationship. 
This means that their systematic risk is approximately the same and if this relation 
remains stable in time (if there are no idiosyncratic shocks on either asset) then a 
long short position should produce a risk free (beta neutral) portfolio with an excess 
return (over a risk free benchmark asset) of zero.  
On the contrary, if the value and risk drivers remain the same but the price 
relationship doesn’t, then the relative miss price can be explored when is large 
enough to cover the risks and costs involved. In such cases it is expected that this 
spread will revert to the historical values when markets participants acknowledge 
the discrepancy so the strategy would buy the asset with the relative price 
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decrease, sell the one with the relative price increase and wait for a convergence in 
the relative price to close the position.  
There are several ways in which the pairs trading strategy can be implemented. In 
the work of GGR pairs of similar assets (listed stocks on US equity market) are 
discovered through a period of pairs formation (a training period) consisting of 250 
working days (the equivalent to a trading year). In this period pairs are formed with 
all available assets in the sample, this is, if a sample of 5 stocks is used then 10 
possible pairs can be formed as is showed in the following example: 
5!
2!  5  2!  10 
With all possible pairs formed we then evaluate how similar those pairs are using 
only the daily price data. For that purpose GGR proposes a closeness measure that 
first normalizes the prices of the assets that form a pair to the first day of the 250 
days training period and then sums the absolute daily spread for that period. If the 
prices of the two assets in the pair are a linear combination for the whole 250 days 
period then the closeness measure would be 0. This measure is proposed as proxy 
of how similar the assets are. 
With this measure calculated for all the possible pairs that have price data in the 
period the top 20 pairs, which are the ones who have the smallest closeness value, 
are taken into a trading period of 125 working days (equivalent to half a trading 
year). In this period the chosen pairs are monitored and if the spread between the 
assets of a top 20 pair becomes wider than 2 historical standard deviations 
(calculated in the training period) a Long/Short position is taken. When and if prices 
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cross (the spread between the normalized prices crosses 0) again the position is 
unwind. If at the end of the trading period a position is opened or if one of the 
stocks in the pair is delisted then the position is unwind.  
Chart 1 is an example of a 250 trading days period for a pair of very similar assets 
and Chart 2 is a representation of the following 125 trading days period. 
Chart 1 
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The chart shows the 125 trading period for the two assets represented in chart 1. 
 
This simple strategy is reported to generate yearly excess returns of 11% for the 
period 1962-2002. Since then some authors have dug deep into the Pairs trading 
strategy in an attempt to evaluate the risks and costs involved in the strategy and to 
improve it by implementing different ways of selecting and trading the pairs. 
Some authors have proposed different ways of finding similar assets like 
Vidyamurthy (2004) with co-integration and Elliott, van der Hoek and Malcolm 
(2005) with a Kalman filter to model the spread. The objective was to better identify 
pairs of similar securities with a high probability of price drifting (authors are yet to 
include the historical probability of drifting and then converging). Others have also 
proposed alternative ways of determine pairs that go into the trading period beside 
past performance as Papadakis and Wysicki (2008) with accounting information. 
These authors found that pairs that open around accounting events are less 






























Days of the Trading Period
Example of Pair in Trading Period
Asset 1 Asset 2 Open/Close Signal
The spread diverges by 
more than 2 historical 
standard deviations and 
a position is opened 
 
Pair is Open 
Spread crosses and 
the pair is closed 
successfully 
The end of the 125 days 
period arrives and the 
pair is closed 
Pair is Closed 
Pair is Open 
The spread 
diverges again and 
a position is open 
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that the accounting events (or other form of idiosyncratic shocks) change the 
relationship between the securities that form the pair thus affecting its historical 
relationship and its profitability. The break of the initial rationale (the idiosyncratic 
shock) by an accounting event can justify the introduction of a filter to avoid such 
situations. Engelberg, Gao and Jagannathan (2009) also confirm this idea and found 
that informational events other than accounting ones also reduced the profitability 
of pairs trading and that some of the excess returns could be explained by exposure 
to liquidity risk. They found that there was a faster convergence on pairs with 
reduced liquidity which can indicate that there is a premium for liquidity provision.  
Further on the analysis of the excess return Do and Faff (2011) tested the 
robustness of reported pairs trading returns against the main sources of explicit 
costs namely commissions, market impact and selling fees. They found that after 
controlling for these costs and the common sources for systematic risk the reported 
profitability in GGR was lost. Do and Faff (2011) conclusions can clear the challenge 
that pairs trading (as proposed by GGR) poses to the efficient market hypothesis. It 
can also help to explain why the strategy remained profitable even after the initial 
work by GGR was released. But this doesn’t exclude the possibility that there is 
some variant form of the strategy that is profitable without breaking the initial 
rationale. An indication for this may come from the fact that some market 
participants engage in pairs trading and as the authors of GGR stated “In our study 
we have not searched over the full strategy space to identify successful trading 
rules, but rather we have interpreted practitioner description of pairs trading as 
straightforwardly as possible”. This leaves space for improvement under the same 
rationale. Also to be noted is that some characteristics of the GGR proposed 
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strategy were assigned by the authors own perception of reasonable values used by 
market participants. These characteristics include the 250 and 125 days for the 
training and trading period respectively, the 2 standard deviation for the opening 
trigger or the absence of any risk management measure. This final issue, the risk 
management control, is a common dimension among strategies that market 
participants utilize and as mentioned is yet to be introduced. There is still 
divergence about the risk and cost adjusted profitability of pairs trading and past 
literature has left some pending questions. 
 
2.2. Unresolved Questions 
There are several questions to be noted in previous literature regarding pairs 
trading. One is the paradox noted by Do and Faff (2011) that points out to the fact 
that we are looking for the closest pairs in the past and expecting that they are the 
ones with the highest probability of drifting and then converging in the future. The 
stability of the price relation and the probability of divergence (followed by 
convergence) by uninformed demand are two distinct characteristics. This idea 
suggests that there is space for improvement in the way the pairs are ranked and 
chosen, and not only regarding the price relation stability but also including a 
second dimension (maybe a second form of ranking) that would take into account 
the probability of a pair diverging. Another interesting and related matter is that the 
methodology proposed by GGR (as noted by the authors themselves) doesn’t 
exclude the possibility of a pair being chosen to trade with a negative maximum 
expected return after costs (for pairs with a short historical standard deviation 
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measure that is used as a trigger). This leaves the need to establish such a filter that 
would leave out some pairs that are by definition destroying value or in the best 
possible scenario not adding (if they do not trade). Another relevant question is the 
exposure to idiosyncratic risk explored by Papadakis and Wysicki (2008) regarding 
accounting events and Engelberg, Gao and Jagannathan (2009) regarding general 
news. The principle underlying this idea is that pairs are exposed to idiosyncratic 
shocks and if an idiosyncratic shock affects one of the assets (for example, a fire 
destroys a major factory of one of the companies) then the expected relation 
between the assets is changed and the rationale behind the trading of the pair is 
lost (as its profitability). It is possible that this risk can be avoid at the opening of the 
pair, by monitoring for idiosyncratic shocks, but not while a position is open. This 
risk will always be present and can only be reduced at tops (by monitoring the pairs 
before they are traded). So even if we find the best methodology for matching 
pairs, for timing the entry and for managing the risk one cannot avoid or predict an 
idiosyncratic shock while invested. The reported profitability of this strategy can be 
the product of this risk.  
Finally there is the finite horizon and the limited risk capacity problem. In a finite 
horizon strategy with limited risk taking capacity a divergence in price can remain 
beyond the time horizon or the risk bearing capacity leaving to the premature close 
of the position even if the spread consequently closed. These two questions relate 
to something that can be called the inefficiency-efficiency paradox. If an inefficiency 
to be profitable needs the market to recognize the mispricing then it can only be 
consider an inefficiency if the market subsequently does that. If other markets 
participants don’t acknowledge the mispricing then the alleged lack of equilibrium 
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may remain (maybe it can be called irrationality, but not inefficiency).  This is what 
the pairs trading strategy expects and needs to be profitable, a momentary lack of 
equilibrium. 
It seems that there is a legitimate space for improving the pairs trading strategy 
without incurring in data snooping or data fitting bias. 
 
2.3. Keeping the Rationale, Improving Performance 
If the historical relationship between two very similar assets changes then the 
rationale of trading such a pair is lost and it shouldn’t be opened or should be 
closed (if it was trading). The catalyst for that change can be attributed to 
something different in the fundamentals like a change in strategy or a sale of some 
of the company’s assets or it can be linked to the expectations of the investors 
regarding that particular company earnings capacity. And if we believe we are 
exploring a mispricing but a convergence never comes then maybe the market 
participants have changed their valuation and even if nothing fundamental has 
changed the convergence will never happen. With that idea in mind two hypotheses 
are tested. 
2.3.1. Opening Pairs after Shocks 
Between the pair’s training period and the opening of a position the relation 
between the assets that form the pair can dramatically change. In an attempt to 
monitor events that could lead to such a change one can monitor the demand for 
that asset and try to find abnormal changes (increases) that could signify such an 
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event. One way to do that is through the volume data. Engelberg, Gao and 
Jagannathan (2009) test the same rationale with news data and find that news 
affecting just one of the assets decreases the profitability and news that affect both 
assets increases profitability (they argue that the increased profitability could be 
explained by differences in the speed information is incorporated). It’s expected 
that the volume data yields the same result with the advantage that is far easier to 
be implemented in a trading strategy (the information is more accurate then the 
number and importance of news and is widely available). So it’s expected that if a 
common shock exists then a volume increase will occur in both assets and if that 
shock only affects one of the assets then the volume increase will be confined to an 
increase in the respective assets volume. With that in mind the first hypothesis 
comes: Are pairs that open with single sided shocks less profitable and is volume 
data a good proxy for shocks? 
2.3.2. Applying a Limit to the time a Pair is Open 
A pair opens if the relative price of the assets diverges by more than they usually 
did in the recent past (the 250 trading days period). This divergence is expected to 
be temporary and the product of market friction and inefficiencies and the new 
market equilibrium is expected to arrive in a short matter of time when participants 
acknowledge the mispricing. If that expected equilibrium (the price convergence) 
fails to come in a reasonable amount of time then maybe something fundamental 
has change in the assets that form the pair and the new equilibrium is already set 
(the price convergence is no longer expected). If a pair remains open for a long time 
we can start to assume that the excess value we thought it had isn’t there and the 
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risk of holding it isn’t worth taking. In this situation the hedge we thought we had is 
lost and there is no rationale left for holding the position and bearing the risk. The 
second hypothesis looks to answer that question: Is it a good strategy to limit to the 





III. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Sample 
The sample used in all tests comprises daily price and volume data for all US listed 
stocks (from the major indexes) present in Bloomberg and DataStream databases 
for the period between 1 January of 1990 and 1 January of 2011. This totals 2,445 
assets with a maximum of 5,265 trading days (for the stocks that cover all the 
period) and more than 5 million price and volume daily observations. There is no 
filter criterion to the sample. Table 1, 2, 3 and 4 summarizes the characteristics of 
the sample used in all tests.  
Table 1 - Distribution of Assets by Sector 
Sector Number of Assets % of Total 
Financial Services 219 8.96% 
Real Estate Investment Trusts 189 7.73% 
Support Services 146 5.97% 
Oil & Gas Producers 130 5.32% 
Health Care Equipment & Services 119 4.87% 
General Retailers 118 4.83% 
Banks 114 4.66% 
Travel & Leisure 113 4.62% 
Media 87 3.56% 
Oil Equipment & Services 86 3.52% 
Nonlife Insurance 84 3.44% 
Electronic & Electrical Equipment 81 3.31% 
Unclassified 71 2.90% 
Industrial Engineering 69 2.82% 
Industrial Transportation 68 2.78% 
Software & Computer Services 62 2.54% 
Household Goods & Home Construction 59 2.41% 
Chemicals 55 2.25% 
Real Estate Investment & Services 52 2.13% 
Construction & Materials 50 2.04% 
Technology Hardware & Equipmen 47 1.92% 
Food Producers 40 1.64% 
Personal Goods 40 1.64% 
Life Insurance 38 1.55% 
Mining 38 1.55% 
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 35 1.43% 
Industrial Metals & Mining 31 1.27% 
Electricity 27 1.10% 
Aerospace & Defense 21 0.86% 
Automobiles & Parts 21 0.86% 
Fixed Line Telecommunications 21 0.86% 
Food & Drug Retailers 20 0.82% 
Gas, Water & Multiutilities 20 0.82% 
General Industrials 20 0.82% 
Leisure Goods 19 0.78% 
Forestry & Paper 10 0.41% 
Beverages 9 0.37% 
Mobile Telecommunications 7 0.29% 
Tobacco 7 0.29% 
Alternative Energy 2 0.08% 




Table 2 - Average Volume and Trading Days 
Number of Assets 2445 
Average Daily  Volume (In Shares) 847,348 
Average Trading Days for each Asset 2057 
 
Table 3 - Average Assets to trade for each year 























Table 4 - Sample descriptive statistics 
  Price Volume 
n 5,030,358 5,030,358 
Average 22.88 797,615 
Standard Deviation 56.99 7,277,171 
Median 16.69 142,500 
Mode 10.00 1,000 
Maximum 76,875 3,772,638,464 
Minimum 0.0001 0 
 
3.2. Pairs Formation and Trading Period 
The methodology used for building the trading rules is the one proposed in GGR 
with the “wait one day rule” (the opening and close of a pair is delayed by one day 
to avoid the bid-ask bounce): There is a 250 working days period (the equivalent to 
a trading year) in which all possible pairs are formed and the sum of the squared 
deviations between the two normalized price series (prices are normalized to day 1 
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Then pairs are then ranked according to this measure (the smallest the closeness 
the better) and the Top “n” are taken into a period of 125 working days for trading 
(the equivalent to a six month trading period). The prices of the pairs are again 
normalized to the first day of this 125 day period and we start to monitor them. In 
this period if the spread between the assets is wider than 2 historical standard 
deviations (calculated in the 250 days training period) a Long/Short position is taken 
going short the asset that had the relative price increase and long the other. The 
trigger is calculated as following: 
Formula 2 
)!"**!|  +2  ,&-.  

 
  !"# $ %&  " '( " 
  !"# $ %&  " '( "  








Then the following position is set: 
Formula 4 











When and if prices cross again the position is unwind. If at the end of the 125 days 
trading period a position is opened or if one of the stocks in the pair is delisted then 
the position is unwind. 
One difference in methodologies used is that GGR overlaps the period of 125 days 
of trading creating a number of portfolios that can be simultaneous trading the 
same pairs. The results presented here do not follow this methodology and the 
trading periods of 125 days do not overlap (they are 125 trading days apart) as 
shown in figure 1.  
Figure 1 - Formation and Trading Period Representation 
Formation Period: The price series of the assets are normalized to the first day and a measure of 
closeness (the sum of the square differences of the normalized prices) is taken for all possible pairs. 
Trading Period: The top “n” pairs, the ones with the smallest value of closeness are monitored and if 
the spread between the normalized prices (normalized to the first day of the trading period) is wider 
than the closeness measure plus 2 standard deviations (the standard deviation of the closeness 
measure taken from the formation period) a position is open. 
        
Formation Period (250 Days)     
    Trading Period (125 Days)   
  Formation Period (250 Days)   
      Trading Period (125 Days) 
        
 
This is the simulation of the strategy of GGR and is used as a benchmark strategy to 




A pair total return is computed as following: 
Formula 5 
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All the reported returns for the portfolios are computed on the capital that is 
actually invested at any time (GGR names this as “Fully Invested Returns”). So if just 
one of the top pairs is trading the daily mark to market is computed as being that 
pair daily return. The daily mark to market of the portfolio is computed as following: 
Formula 6 
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One new rule that limits the number of days a pair is open (without convergence) is 
introduced with 5 variations: A variation for 15, 25, 50, 75 and 100 days limit is 
tested (the original strategy in GGR can be thought as a 125 day limit). If a pair is 
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closed because of this new rule then that specific pair will not trade anymore for 
that 125 day period. This ensures that the pairs traded in this variation are less or 
the same that the pairs traded in the GGR strategy and that they will be open for 
less or the same days. 
Another introduction to the GGR strategy (that doesn’t affect the strategy in any 
way) is the classification of a pair in terms of volume shocks. In the pairs training 
period (consisting of the 250 working days prior to the trading period of 125 days) 
the average and standard deviation of volume is taken for each asset. This is the 
reference demand for that asset. Then, when a pair opens (on the day the trigger is 
activated), it’s classified in one of three ways:  
• If the volume of one of the assets in the pair (and just one) is greater 
than the reference value the pair is classified has “Individual Shock”. 
"$ FGH@ 0 4HI ' GH@ J 4HI K 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• If the volume in the two assets is greater than the reference the pair 
is classified as “Common Shock”.  
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• If none of the assets volume is greater than the reference the pair is 
classified as “No Shock”.  
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For the reference value three situations are included: The reference is the average 
volume, the average volume plus 1 standard deviation and the average volume plus 
2 standard deviations. 
This methodology will allow a direct comparison of the changes introduced and the 
original strategy proposed in GGR so we can evaluate the impact of these new 
variations. Comparisons are made based on the Top 100 pair portfolios because 
they represent a more diversified portfolio and an increased data sample which 






4.1. GGR Results after 2002 
GGR reported annualized returns of 11% for the period from July 1963 to December 
2002. For the Top 20 portfolio that simulates the strategy used in GGR two distinct 
periods stand out from Table 5 and Table 6, the period until 2002 where annualized 
returns of 11.30% are achieved and the period from 2002 to 2010 when annualized 
returns (for the Top 20 strategy) drop to 5.60%. 
Table 5 - Portfolio annualized returns for each strategy 
This table presents the annualized returns of the different strategies: The one proposed in GGR, 
with a 15 day limit on the time pairs are trading (open), with a 25 day limit, a 50 day limit, a 75 day 
limit and with 100 day limit. Returns are calculated based on the invested capital and compounded 
on a monthly basis (monthly reinvestment of profits). 
             
 GGR 15 Days 25 Days 50 Days 75 Days 100 Days 
Year Top 20 
Top 
100 Top 20 
Top 
100 Top 20 
Top 
100 Top 20 
Top 
100 Top 20 
Top 
100 Top 20 
Top 
100 
1991 6.4% 5.8% 4.9% 7.2% 7.6% 9.7% 8.6% 6.7% 7.5% 6.2% 6.8% 6.0% 
1992 8.7% 12.0% 7.2% 22.6% 13.2% 18.4% 9.1% 13.6% 8.2% 12.1% 8.7% 11.8% 
1993 21.5% 17.8% 22.6% 19.5% 23.9% 26.0% 21.5% 20.6% 21.4% 18.8% 21.3% 18.3% 
1994 9.5% 11.6% 3.2% 10.9% 11.0% 17.9% 8.7% 11.6% 11.1% 11.6% 9.2% 11.6% 
1995 13.5% 14.6% 11.9% 20.9% 9.3% 17.3% 14.6% 18.1% 13.7% 16.3% 12.8% 14.9% 
1996 0.2% 8.4% -3.0% 9.1% -2.7% 8.1% 2.1% 8.8% -0.2% 8.2% -0.1% 8.2% 
1997 12.4% 11.8% 9.8% 17.6% 11.7% 20.1% 16.1% 15.1% 14.0% 13.3% 12.0% 11.7% 
1998 11.9% 10.4% 6.4% 24.4% 23.4% 17.2% 18.5% 14.3% 10.6% 10.5% 11.7% 10.4% 
1999 18.6% 18.2% 12.7% 28.2% 26.2% 26.1% 23.8% 20.9% 20.5% 19.0% 18.8% 18.4% 
2000 15.2% 14.2% 13.0% 4.5% 18.9% 15.2% 14.7% 14.2% 15.0% 13.9% 15.1% 14.0% 
2001 11.0% 13.8% 13.8% 16.9% 11.8% 16.4% 11.4% 15.1% 11.3% 14.2% 11.1% 13.9% 
2002 8.7% 3.5% 5.2% 7.3% 13.3% 12.4% 11.7% 6.8% 8.7% 4.0% 9.0% 3.7% 
2003 -2.4% 5.5% -0.2% 8.2% -6.7% 4.4% -4.4% 5.4% -3.0% 5.1% -2.4% 5.5% 
2004 4.8% 6.7% 4.9% 14.1% 8.6% 12.6% 7.8% 8.4% 5.7% 7.3% 5.4% 6.8% 
2005 1.4% 1.6% -1.1% 7.0% -2.9% 5.0% 3.4% 3.7% 1.1% 1.8% -0.2% 1.1% 
2006 1.0% 7.6% -6.7% 6.1% 7.0% 6.8% 2.2% 7.8% 2.4% 8.4% 1.0% 7.5% 
2007 3.3% 4.4% -0.2% 1.6% 7.7% 6.5% 5.3% 6.3% 4.4% 4.7% 3.6% 4.6% 
2008 22.2% 23.4% 8.1% 10.7% 25.0% 27.6% 26.0% 25.9% 25.6% 25.6% 23.0% 23.6% 
2009 4.4% 22.1% 13.9% 34.6% 6.7% 27.3% 6.4% 25.4% 6.4% 23.0% 4.3% 22.3% 





Table 6 – Portfolio annualized returns for the period between 1991 and 2002 and for the period 
between 2003 and 2010 
This table presents the annualized returns for 2 periods: One from 1 January 1991 to 31 December 
2002 that overlaps with a segment of the period tested in GGR and a second one from 1 January 
2003 to 31 December 2010. Returns are calculated based on the invested capital and compounded 
on a monthly basis (monthly reinvestment of profits). 
             


























(1991-2002) 11.3% 11.8% 8.8% 15.5% 13.7% 16.9% 13.3% 13.7% 11.7% 12.3% 11.3% 11.8% 
(2003-2010) 5.6% 9.9% 4.0% 10.5% 7.0% 12.2% 7.2% 11.4% 6.6% 10.6% 5.6% 9.9% 
 
From 2003 to 2007 returns were dramatically lower than the previous period. This 
suggests that something fundamental has change after 2002. This was the year 
when the revised paper, GGR, was published. The previous results, Gatev, 
Goetzmann and Rouwenhorts (1999) are from 1999 and the authors were 
surprised, throughout the revision of the earlier version, that the results (the excess 
returns) from 1999 to 2002 were still significantly positive. This may indicate that 
the market has acknowledged the results and corrected this statistical evidence by 
deploying similar strategies. On the other hand it could also signify that a latent risk 
factor was present for that period and that the reported excess returns aren’t has 
high has it was thought. 
 Also to be noted from Table 5 is that returns picked up from 2008 to 2011 with 
double digit figures and that 2008 was an extremely good year (in fact, the best 
year for the period under analysis) although US equity markets had one of the worst 
years in history (for example, the equity index S&P 500 lost 37% of its value). 
Another characteristic that stands out is that the Top 100 pair portfolio in the GGR 




4.2. Limiting the Time a Pair is Open 
Table 7 presents the descriptive statistics for the pairs and Table 8 the monthly 
returns for the portfolios when we limit the days a pair is allowed to be trading (the 
pair is open). 
Table 7 - Pairs Statistics 
Descriptive statistics of the Pairs Returns following the strategy proposed by GGR. Pairs are formed 
over a 250 trading days period according to a minimum distance criteria, and then traded over the 
subsequent 125 trading days period. A pair is open (traded) on the day following the day on which 
the prices of the assets in the pair diverge by more than 2 historical standard deviations. The top 
pairs (Top 20 or Top 100) are the pairs with the least distance measures. Pairs are allowed to be 
open for a maximum of 125 days on the GGR strategy and for the indicated days (15, 25, 50, 75 or 
100) in the remaining strategies. 
 
             


























n 1219 6224 934 4694 1034 5238 1168 5920 1211 6156 1217 6221 
Average 0.57% 0.61% 0.42% 0.46% 0.51% 0.55% 0.58% 0.64% 0.57% 0.61% 0.49% 0.61% 
Standard Error (For the 
Average) 0.14% 0.07% 0.09% 0.04% 0.11% 0.05% 0.12% 0.06% 0.13% 0.06% 0.14% 0.07% 
Standard Deviation 4.96% 5.25% 2.86% 2.92% 3.39% 3.48% 4.26% 4.38% 4.61% 4.93% 4.99% 5.15% 
Median 1.81% 1.84% 0.64% 0.56% 0.81% 0.78% 1.37% 1.36% 1.65% 1.69% 1.78% 1.81% 
Skewness -2.06 -2.53 -0.27 -0.37 -1.03 -0.79 -1.57 -2.17 -1.61 -2.50 -2.03 -2.32 
Kurtosis 9.28 21.15 1.92 3.16 5.96 8.94 6.53 26.22 6.01 27.76 9.20 18.94 
Sharpe Ration (Risk Free 
0%) 0.116 0.116 0.146 0.156 0.149 0.159 0.137 0.146 0.124 0.124 0.099 0.118 
Negative Return Pairs 33% 34% 41% 41% 39% 40% 35% 37% 35% 35% 34% 34% 
Average Trades Per Pair 1.59 1.63 1.22 1.23 1.35 1.37 1.52 1.43 1.58 1.61 1.58 1.63 
Average Time Pairs are 





Table 8 - Portfolio Statistics (Monthly Returns) 
Descriptive statistics of the Pairs Returns following the strategy proposed by GGR. Pairs are 
formed over a 250 trading days period according to a minimum distance criteria, and then traded 
over the subsequent 125 trading days period. A pair is open (traded) on the day following the day 
on which the prices of the assets in the pair diverge by more than 2 historical standard deviations. 
The top pairs (Top 20 or Top 100) are the pairs with the least distance measures. Pairs are allowed 
to be open for a maximum of 125 days on the GGR strategy and for the indicated days (15, 25, 50, 
75 or 100) in the remaining strategies. 
 
             


























n 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 
Average 0.73% 0.88% 0.58% 1.08% 0.89% 1.19% 0.87% 1.02% 0.78% 0.93% 0.73% 0.89% 
Standard Error 
(For the Average) 0.10% 0.09% 0.14% 0.13% 0.13% 0.11% 0.11% 0.09% 0.11% 0.09% 0.10% 0.09% 
Standard 
Deviation 1.59% 1.34% 2.12% 2.03% 2.03% 1.69% 1.75% 1.46% 1.63% 1.39% 1.59% 1.36% 
Median 0.61% 0.74% 0.52% 1.00% 0.69% 1.01% 0.77% 0.89% 0.62% 0.75% 0.62% 0.73% 
Skewness 0.60 0.31 0.19 0.25 0.51 0.30 0.36 0.36 0.57 0.38 0.57 0.32 
Kurtosis 1.55 1.73 1.58 2.96 1.12 1.53 0.31 1.97 1.33 1.73 1.46 1.67 
Maximum 8% 5% 9% 11% 9% 7% 6% 6% 8% 5% 8% 5% 
Minimum -3% -4% -6% -7% -4% -5% 210% 245% 188% 223% 175% 213% 
Negative Return 
Months 33% 24% 36% 25% 32% 22% 33% 19% 32% 23% 33% 25% 
 
It’s clear by Table 8 that the average monthly return (for the portfolio comprising of 
the 100 top pairs) increases no matter the limit in days that is applied, achieving the 
best performance for the 25 day limit.  The monthly return ranges from 0.88% for 
the GGR strategy to 1.19% for the 25 day limit strategy (a range of 0.31%). Looking 
at the return characteristics of the pairs (Table 7) one can see that although the 
average return on the pair is lower on the 15 and 25 days limit (in comparison with 
the GGR results) there is a gain to be noted on the standard deviation side (in all the 
limits). The Sharpe ratio shows exactly that: It’s the lowest for the GGR strategy and 
the highest for the 25 days limit, just as the monthly returns. This suggests that this 
kind of strategy adds value without increasing the portfolio risk (it trades the same 
pairs for less time and/or avoids some trades) generating on the long term far 




The chart shows how much would yield an investment on the different strategies (for the Top 100 
Pairs portfolio) for the period from 1 January 1991 to 31 December 2010. 
 
 
The chart is clear in showing that an investment on the GGR strategy would result in 
the lowest return of them all. This is also translated on the annualized return: For 
the Top 100 strategies GGR achieves an 11.02% annualized return for the whole 
period against a 15.02% return for the 25 day limit. So whatever limit is imposed on 
the number of days a pair is trading there is an improvement on the strategies 
returns (with no increase in risk). 
4.3. Volume Events 
Table 9 shows that for every definition of volume event (average, average plus one 
standard deviation or average plus 2 standard deviations) the return of the pairs is 
































































































































































































Accumulated Returns of the Different Strategies - Monthly Compounded
15 Days Limit 25 Days Limit 50 Days Limit
75 Days Limit 100 Days Limit GGR Strategy
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on one asset and when there is no event the average return falls between the two 
other classifications. 
Table 9 - Pairs statistics (by volume) 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the top 100 pairs following the GGR strategy. Pairs 
are classified according to three distinct ways of defining a shock: In the first case a shock is 
defined as a day in which the volume (on the day the pair triggers) is greater than the average 
volume taken on the 250 days formation period, in the second case a shock is when the volume is 
greater than the average plus 1 standard deviation and in the third case a shock is when the 
volume is greater than the average plus 2 standard deviations. 
 
          
 
Average Volume 
Average Plus 1 Standard 
Deviation 





















n 1313 2889 2022 3662 2083 479 4724 1342 158 
Average 0.58% 0.44% 0.87% 0.60% 0.50% 1.10% 0.61% 0.57% 0.89% 
Standard Error (For the 
Average) 0.14% 0.10% 0.12% 0.08% 0.12% 0.30% 0.07% 0.15% 0.67% 
Standard Deviation 5.06% 5.11% 5.54% 4.85% 5.53% 6.67% 5.02% 5.54% 8.46% 
Median 1.74% 1.76% 1.97% 1.82% 1.83% 2.08% 1.85% 1.78% 2.05% 
Skewness -3.7 -2.1 -2.5 -2.7 -1.8 -3.8 -2.5 -1.5 -4.9 
Kurtosis 43 10 23 24 9 38 20 6 42 
Sharpe Ration (Risk 
Free 0%) 0.115 0.086 0.157 0.124 0.091 0.165 0.121 0.104 0.106 
Negative Return Pairs 34% 36% 32% 34% 35% 29% 34% 35% 30% 
Average Trades Per 
Pair 1.14 1.27 1.28 1.37 1.24 1.16 1.47 1.17 1.09 
Average Time Pairs are 
Open (in Months) 1.48 1.53 1.46 1.49 1.54 1.36 1.48 1.56 1.33 
Cross Pairs 52% 49% 52% 51% 49% 54% 51% 48% 53% 
End of Period 48% 51% 48% 49% 51% 46% 49% 52% 47% 
 
This regularity is also observed in the sharpe ratio with the exception of when the 
volume event is defined as the average plus 2 standard deviation, although the 
error is too high to draw any conclusion (the sample of pairs with volume events in 
both pairs becomes too small, n=158). These results confirm the findings of 
Engelberg, Gao and Jagannathan (2009) that pairs opening after news that affected 
both assets exhibit superior returns and that when news affected just one of the 
assets returns were under average. This opens the door for the possibility that 
market participants have acknowledged these high return pairs and use this 
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information to form a conditional filter on the opening of the pairs (opening pairs 
only if there are shocks that affect both assets). It’s also important to note that this 
volume information is a good proxy for idiosyncratic or common shocks and that it’s 
available before the opening of the pair (pairs are open one day after the trigger 






The results show that the simple relative value model presented by GGR has margin 
to be improved through simple rationales coherent with the main idea.   
The limit introduced on the maximum days a pair is open improves the risk return 
characteristics no matter what limit is imposed which appears to support the 
rationale that a convergence must be observed in a short period of time. We can 
also conclude that is best to avoid pairs that trigger around abnormal volume 
changes in one of the assets. 
It’s fair to expect that market participants took and take these strategies to levels of 
sophistication beyond what is tested and presented here and that those returns can 
prove to be resilient to the explicit and implicit costs that Do and Faff (2011) have 
analyzed. With just the introduction of a limit of 25 days on the time a pair is open 
would add 5% on a yearly base to the original (GGR) strategy of a portfolio 
comprising of the Top 100 pairs. 
It’s plausible to think that these modifications and others are employed by some 
more or less sophisticated market participants and that the returns generated can 
challenge the weak form of the efficient market hypothesis. It’s also possible that 
with the high frequency price data that is available today this strategies are taken to 
an intraday level where the price divergences could prove to be momentarily larger 
and thus the strategy prove to be more profitable.  
But some fundamental questions still persist: Market participants often employ 
strategies with some type of risk management control. Pairs trading, as proposed by 
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GGR is lacking such characteristic. Other questions relate to the extent to which 
returns are indeed the result of liquidity provision or how much close are the 
reference values used by GGR, namely the training and trading period and the 2 
standard deviation trigger, to the values that market participant’s really use. 
It’s still unclear the real merits of pairs trading and what results different formats of 
this strategy would yield. What we can conclude is that the excess returns 
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